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Pretrial Detention and the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments
James Lowe*
The work in the name of equality is far from done .... Beyond
the schools lie ... public accommodations of every sort . . . housing,
jobs, voting, police protection, and so on. And still beyond them all
are poverty and the victims of poverty . . . where race prejudice,
minority status, and many other social and personal factors are
compounded.'
T IS THE INTENT OF THE WRITER of this paper to examine the conditions
endured by indigent defendants through their pretrial detention in
Cuyahoga County Jail with respect to the Constitutional prohibitions of
"cruel and unusual" punishment and a denial of "equal protection of the
laws." Cuyahoga County is better known as Cleveland, Ohio.
Expediency requires that the important concept of the rights of
indigent inmates as they relate to civil rights statutes, and particularly
Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, not be considered here. It may be hoped,
however, that the propositions and legal considerations put forth in this
paper will lead logically to an in-depth consideration of this area as well
as in some future article.
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
2
These guarantees to the individual, and prohibitions to the State,
were included in the Bill of Rights. They stand, with the other pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights (Amendments I to VIII), as being so basic
to the system of justice which the framers envisaged that they may
neither be abridged nor denied by the government of the United States,
or through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, by any
of the sovereign states.'
That concept being properly established and agreed upon,4 the ques-
tion then becomes, What is the import and effect of such sacred and fun-
damental guarantees? Yet the Supreme Court of the United States has
been perhaps unwilling, perhaps unable to answer this question. With
regard to the concept of "cruel and unusual punishments," it has tradi-
tionally been a simpler task to state with certainty those situations which
are not protected by this guarantee than to assert the areas within its
realm.'
* BA., University of Pennsylvania; Fourth-year student at Cleveland State Uni-
versity College of Law.
1 J. TENBROcK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 15-16 (rev. ed. 1965). Taken from Abascal, Mu-
nicipal Services and Equal Protection, 20 HAsT NGs L. J. 1367, 1374 (1968).
2 U. S. CONST., amend. VIII.
3 Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250, 254 (3rd Cir. 1949).
4 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571,
576 (8th Cir. 1968); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
5 Weens v. U. S., 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947);
Ex Parte Pickens, 101 F. Supp. 285 (Terr. of Alaska 1951).
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The Supreme Court has continually acknowledged that "cruel and
unusual punishments" is a phrase and a guarantee elusive of definition.
6
This is, of course, little comfort to the man who, held pending trial and
presumed by the law to be innocent, is made to lie on the floor of a cell
at Cuyahoga County Jail because there are not enough beds in that facil-
ity to accommodate all who are housed therein and, even if there were
enough beds available, there would be no place to put them.7 Already
in this man's cell block there are approximately 160 men huddled to-
gether in confinement in an area designed to hold a maximum of 60 in-
mates.' What small floorspace there might have been in the past for the
prisoners to walk, is now taken up exclusively by beds.9 There are no
recreation areas either inside or outside of the Cuyahoga County Jail.'0
None of this is to say, of course, that it is the malicious intent of the
State of Ohio or the Cuyahoga County Commissioners to sustain and
perpetuate such conditions.& 0 a Budget considerations and administrative
decisions with regard to allocation of available funds seem more to blame
for the existing conditions. But Judge Medina, in United States v. Fay
in 1957, cautioned, "We must not play fast and loose with basic consti-
tutional rights in the interest of administrative efficiency." 11
The concept of what constitutes "cruel and unusual punishments" is
flexible. This is perhaps the essential ray of promise in an otherwise
much-forsaken area.
The Eighth Amendment is progressive and does not prohibit
merely the cruel and unusual punishments known in 1689 and 1787,
but may acquire wider meaning as public opinion becomes enlight-
ened by humane justice .... 12
This inherent flexibility in the eighth amendment's prohibition of
inflicting "cruel and unusual punishments" has been noted and re-
affirmed by the courts.
In summary, then, so far as the Supreme Court cases are con-
cerned, we have a flat recognition that the limits of the Eighth
6 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-136 (1878); In re Kenmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447
(1890); Weems v. U. S., 217 U.S. 349, 368-371 (1910); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 87, 99
(1958); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 577 (8th Cir. 1968).
7 From an interview with Sgt. C. Zigarrio, Sheriff's Department, Cuyahoga County,
Ohio (Aug. 11, 1970). (This article focuses specifically on the conditions at the Cuya-
hoga County Jail. Limitations imposed by time and space made personal inspection
of other similar institutions impossible. Clearly, many jails in Ohio and throughout
the United States share many of the problems manifested in the Cuyahoga County




10a In November, 1970, the voters of Cuyahoga County approved a bond issue calling
for the expenditure of $22 million to construct a new jail with facilities to house
2,000 prisoners. Perhaps superficially it might appear that the people have recognized
the problems presented in this paper and have solved them. However, it is not
expected that the new jail will be completed for at least five years. During this time,
thousands of men and women will be detained pending trial in the present 40-year-
old facility. Many of these will be held in violation of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments to the U. S. Constitution.
11 U. S. v. Fay, 247 F.2d 662, 669 (2d Cir. 1957).
12 Weems v. U. S., 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss3/20
Amendment's proscription are not easily or exactly defined, and we
also have clear indications that the applicable standards are flexible
... and that broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized stand-
ards, humanity and decency are useful and usable.'8
That flexibility and "evolving standards of decency" are desirable in
a "maturing society" 14 cannot be denied. Flexibility and evolving stand-
ards of decency unapplied, however, are meaningless. The eloquent rhet-
oric of Mr. Justice Douglas in Robinson v. State of California, wherein
he appealed to the conscience of a country, saying:
The Eighth Amendment expresses the revulsion of civilized man
against barbarous acts-the "cry of horror" against man's inhuman-
ity to his fellow man.15
becomes just rhetoric to the ear of a man who has not eaten hot food
in weeks or months in Cuyahoga County Jail.16 Other invocations of the
"traditional humanity of modem Anglo-American law" 17 and an aver-
sion to "unnecessary pain" 18 and to that which "shocks the most funda-
mental instincts of civilized man" 19 and the promise that the eighth
amendment's basic concept "is nothing less than the basic dignity of
man" 20 fall on the similarly deaf ears of the man awaiting trial who
must live in the same cage with a toilet that does not function merely
because he is suspected of having committed some crime.21 But perhaps
the tour de force of the Court came in the dissent in Powell v. State of
Texas.
In that case, the appellant had been convicted of public drunken-
ness. On appeal citing the decision in Robinson v. State of California,
the appellant contended that he was a chronic alcoholic and as such was
unable to control his compulsion to drink or his subsequent behavior and
that the statute on which his conviction was based made a "status,"
chronic alcoholism, criminal. While the majority felt that this appellant
was not punished criminally for a status he had no power to control, the
dissent in its reference to Robinson acknowledged the fundamental con-
cept.
Robinson stands upon a principle which, despite its sublety
[sic], must be simply stated and respectfully applied because it is
the foundation of individual liberty and the cornerstone of the rela-
tions between a civilized state and its citizens: Criminal penalties
13 Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968).
14 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
15 Robinson v. State of California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962).
10 This is so because the heating coils do not function in the serving cabinets in
which the food is transported from the twelfth floor where the food is prepared to
the floors where the inmates are confined, and, in the time required for its trans-
portation, the food becomes cold. From an interview with Sgt. C. Zigarrio, supra
note 7.
17 Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 473 (dissenting opinion).
20 Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968).
21 Omo Rzv. Cox; ANN. § 2945.04 (Baldwin 1965).
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3) Sept. 1971
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may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is
powerless to change.
22
And yet, set quite apart from this volume of elevated language, of
the 78623 human beings confined at the Cuyahoga County Jail or its an-
nex, the Cleveland House of Correction, 70724 are awaiting trial and thus
must be presumed to be innocent, and of these 707 people awaiting trial,
53025 are being held for non-capital and bailable offenses and would,
therefore, be free to go if they had enough money to procure their re-
lease through the bail system. Every one of these 530 inmates, then, ipso
facto, is, for this purpose, in a condition he is powerless to change, that
is, poverty.
It is only with these above-described 530 people housed at Cuyahoga
County Jail that this paper concerns itself. It is acknowledged here that
the remaining 256 prisoners are properly confined within the dictates of
the Supreme Court, though perhaps it is permissible to entertain the
conviction that the conditions they, too, must endure must be improved
in the interests of humanity and decency.
But it is only as to the 530 inmates awaiting trial for non-capital
offenses, that such confinement becomes "cruel and unusual" within the
prohibitions of the eighth amendment. It is "cruel" in that such treat-
ment as has been discussed earlier is applied to people who have not
been adjudged guilty of any crime and it is "unusual" because the only
innocent people in Cuyahoga County forced to undergo such treatment
are poor people.26 It is, then, unusual as to an entire class of people
which classification makes the punishment no less unusual, as witness the
revulsion of the peoples of the world to the treatment accorded a class
of people in Germany during 'World War I.
In distinguishing these classes on the basis of wealth and in dis-
criminating against the poor alone, the Cuyahoga County Jail is also vio-
lative of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution in its unqualified
mandate that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." 27
In Ohio, the statute which provides for pretrial detention proscribes:
If an offense is not bailable or sufficient bail is not offered, the
accused shall be committed to the jail of the county in which he is
to be tried .... 2
8
Because there are no separate provisions for different classes or
types of people who are to be confined explicit in the statute, it might
be argued that the law applies to all alike and cannot, therefore, be con-
22 Powell v. State of Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 567 (1968).




26 Interview with Sgt. Zigarrio, supra note 7.
27 U. S. CONST., amend. XIV.
28 Omo REV. CODE Am. § 2937.32 (Baldwin 1965).
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strued as violative of the fourteenth amendment's prohibitions. How-
ever, as the Supreme Court of Ohio so correctly noted:
Statutes are capable of violating equal protection in three ways:
(1) A statute may be discriminatory on its face; (2) though fair on
its face, a statute may be applied in a discriminatory manner; and
(3) a statute can violate equal protection because, as in Griffin
(Griffin v. People of the State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585,
100 L. Ed. 891, 1956), the effect of its application causes results
which depend upon the solvency of criminal defendants.29
In the past decade the courts have taken an increasingly critical
view of the practical effects of the bail system itself and the practice of
pretrial detention of those who are unable to buy their release.3 0 Ex-
haustive studies have been conducted, the results of which clearly show
the deleterious effects of pretrial confinement of those unable to secure
bail for bailable offenses. 31 It has also been noted with some consistency
that the denial of liberty to a man merely because he is accused of a
wrong and cannot supply bail is likely to work additional hardships be-
yond that of confinement alone.3 2
It is, nevertheless, only the pretrial confinement itself with which
this study is intended to deal. For it is in that confinement that the
promises made to all citizens of the United States83 are shattered against
the prison doors. The mere fact that, of two men arrested and charged
with the same bailable offense, only one must live his day to day exist-
ence as a caged menace to society, for the sole reason that he is poor, is
a flagrant denial of the guarantee of "equal protection of the laws."
As Mr. Justice Douglas noted,
It would be unconstitutional to fix excessive bail to assure that
a defendant will not gain his freedom .... Yet in the case of an in-
digent defendant, the fixing of bail in even a modest amount may
have the practical effect of denying him release. 34
In this light, the court, in Butler v. Crumlish, acknowledged,
The constitutional authority for a State to distinguish between
criminal defendants by freeing those who supply bail and confining
those who do not, furnishes no justification for any additional in-
29 Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St. 2d 129, 253 N.E.2d 749, 751-752 (1969).
30 Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197, 198 (1960); Bandy v. United States, 82 S. Ct.
11, 13 (1961); Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565, 567-568 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
31 Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia,
102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031-1079 (1954); Foote, Foreword: Comment on the New York
Bail Study, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 685-692 (1958); Roberts and Palermo, A Study of the
Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA. L. Rsv. 693-730 (1958); Foote,
The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: 1, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 959-999 (1965); Foote,
The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: II, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1125-1185 (1965);
Fahringer, Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Griffin and Its Progeny, 16
STAN. L. REV. 394-415 (1964); McKay, Poverty and the Administration of Justice, 35
U. CoLo. L. REv. 323-331 (1963); Segal, Some Procedural and Strategic Inequalities in
Defending the Indigent, 51 A.B.A.J. 1165, 1166 (1965).
32 Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Bandy v. United States, 81
S. Ct. 197, 198 (1960); Fahringer, Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant:
Griffin and Its Progeny, supra note 31, 410-412; Segal, Some Procedural and Strategic
Inequalities in Defending the Indigent, supra note 31, 1166.
3 U. S. CONST., amend. XIV.
34 Bandy v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 11, 12 (1961). 5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1971
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equality of treatment beyond that which is inherent in the confine-
ment itself.
35
Yet it is difficult to imagine an advocacy of the proposition that the
necessity of sleeping on the floor and eating cold meals in a vastly over-
crowded cell block is "inherent" in confinement. Unable to make prep-
arations for his own defense, forced to sleep and eat with convicted crim-
inals, some of whom will use him as an object of sexual assault, living
each day in the knowledge that, should there be a fire, he would surely
perish, 6 prohibited from personal or telephone contact with his family
and friends except on meagerly allotted occasions, mired in filthy and
dreary environs, and treated as one convicted rather than as one accused,
the indigent defendant in pretrial detention must not be held to stand
outside the rhetoric of the Supreme Court or beyond the concepts of fair-
ness and decency on which the American system of justice has built its
foundation.
Therefore, whenever the state is unable to show the increased
likelihood of the defendant's presence at trial outweighs the harm
done by pretrial imprisonment, it seems that, unless the prisoner is
released until trial, the law has been administered to deprive him
of equal protection of the laws.
37
This understanding prompted Mr. Justice Douglas to note affirma-
tively, "Further reflection has led me to conclude that no man should be
denied release because of indigence." 38 There are, nevertheless, 530 men
now confined in Cuyahoga County Jail or its annex who must suffer the
consequences of the crime of poverty39 every day despite the admonition
that "a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on
account of religion, race or color." 40
It has been recognized with some consistency and insight that pre-
trial detention of indigents for otherwise bailable offenses works a sub-
stantial injustice to the rights of the poor. The courts have not dealt with
the additional concern raised here: that pretrial detention in Cuyahoga
County Jail subjects presumably innocent persons to conditions intoler-
able in a progressive and enlightened society and that, irrespective of the
question of bail which has been analyzed extensively, these conditions
alone warrant the immediate release of those individuals who, discrimi-
nated against solely because of their indigence, endure such hardships
as constitute "cruel and unusual punishments" and a denial of the "equal
protection of the laws" within the very essence of the proscription of the
eighth and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
35 Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565, 567 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
36 This is so because there are, practically, only two avenues of escape from the
Cuyahoga County Jail, both of which are manually controlled elevators. One el-
evator can accommodate a maximum of 18 prisoners, while the other elevator can
hold up to 13 prisoners. The Cuyahoga County Jail is twelve stories high and pris-
oners are confined almost throughout the building. While Sgt. Zigarrio told me that
the building could be evacuated in ten minutes, it is common knowledge among the
inmates that this could not be done. They feel that, should there be a fire, they will
be killed. From interviews held at Cuyahoga County Jail (Aug. 11, 1970).
37 Fahringer, supra note 31, at 411-412.
38 Bandy v. U. S., 82 S. Ct. 11, 13 (1961).
39 Fahringer, supra note 31, at 411.
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